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Cardiff Law School Innocence Project 
Dennis Eady and Stewart Field 
Introduction 
Recent years have seen the emergence in British Universities of what are 
often termed ‘innocence projects’ in which students, acting under the 
supervision of academics and sometimes legal practitioners, re-
investigate alleged miscarriages of justice. Innocence projects started in 
the United States but now exist in a range of traditional common law 
jurisdictions as well as some countries from Continental Europe. The first 
project was started in 1992 at the Benjamin Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva 
University, New York. By 2004 an international Innocence Network (IN) 
had been established which now has 68 member projects worldwide. The 
first British innocence project was set up by Michael Naughton in 2005 at 
the University of Bristol. At one stage, there were around 35 university 
projects in the UK but the number has now declined to around 15 with 
some institutions now using alternative titles such as Miscarriage of 
Justice Unit.1 Nevertheless, they have become an established feature of 
University pro bono provision in the UK.2 In 2014, the Cardiff Law School 
Innocence Project (CLSIP) became the first - and so far the only - 
University project to pursue investigations that led not just to the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission (CCRC) making a referral to the Court of 
Appeal (CA) but also to the ultimate quashing of the conviction.3 Yet the 
																																								 																					
1 For an analysis of the current situation and future prospects for innocence projects in 
the UK, see H Greenwood, “The UK innocence movement: past, present, and future?’’ in 
L Luparia (ed), Understanding Wrongful Conviction (2015) and “Innocence projects: 
losing their appeal?” in P McKeown and C Ashford (eds), Social Justice and Legal 
Education (2016 forthcoming).  
2 For a recent profile of the work of University law students in investigating miscarriages 
of justice see ‘Guilty until proven innocent’ (2016) 58 Lawyer 2B 42 
3 This was the case of Dwaine George which involved new scientific evidence relating to 
gunshot residue. The Court of Appeal explicitly paid tribute to the work of the Cardiff 
Law School Innocence Project: R. v George (Dwaine) [2014] EWCA Crim 2507 at para. 
54 
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relationship between these established institutions of the criminal justice 
system and innocence projects has not always been one based on a 
shared vision of how to respond to allegations of wrongful conviction. In 
2015, several representatives of innocent projects, including Cardiff, gave 
evidence to the House of Commons Justice Select Committee. Along with 
others involved in responding to alleged miscarriages, they argued the 
need for a broader approach to intervention by the CCRC and the Court of 
Appeal. This prompted the Select Committee to recommend that the 
CCRC be less cautious in its approach to the criteria for referral and the 
consideration of a broader statutory test for quashing convictions to 
encourage the Court of Appeal to include cases in which no fresh evidence 
or argument is identified. But the Government declined to implement their 
recommendation on the advice of the Court itself.4  
This article draws on the experience of the Cardiff Law School 
Innocence Project (CLSIP) in reinvestigating cases where clients argue 
that they have been wrongfully convicted. The work involves close 
reading of the case-materials and often the commissioning of (further) 
expert reports and the constructing of applications to the CCRC for 
referral to the Court of Appeal. The cases investigated certainly do not 
constitute a representative sample of investigations into serious offences 
and include only one case officially acknowledged to be a miscarriage of 
justice (the case of Dwaine George whose conviction was quashed on 
appeal in December 2014). But they are cases where the defendants 
continue to assert their innocence of very serious offences long after 
conviction and the exhaustion of the normal appeal process. We use the 
experience of the CLSIP to ask questions about truth-finding in a criminal 
																																								 																					
4 House of Commons Justice Committee, Report on Criminal Cases Review Commission 
(2015) HC 850, available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/com mons-
select/justice-committee/publications/. The evidence to the Committee is available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/justice-committee/news/criminal-cases-review-commission-academics/ (both last 
accessed 13th December 2016).  
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justice system still strongly shaped by the adversarial tradition. The 
authors are both based at Cardiff University: one has been a case-
consultant with the innocence project since 2009 with responsibility for 
training students, supervising their case-work and drafting applications to 
the CCRC; the other is an academic with a long-standing interest in the 
assumptions of the adversarial tradition and how they shape criminal 
justice practice on the ground in England and Wales. In Part 1, we 
highlight significant weaknesses in the conduct of police investigations in 
many of the cases examined by the CLSIP as well as limits in the capacity 
of the defence to expose relevant weaknesses in the prosecution case. We 
argue that this suggests vulnerabilities in our approach to fact-finding 
that are linked to the way in which the adversarial tradition has been 
interpreted and operationalized in England and Wales. Specifically, we 
point to continuing uncertainties surrounding the relationship between the 
role of the defence and the police in truth-finding and in the significance 
of defence access to materials generated by police investigation. In Part 2 
we draw on the experience of the CLSIP’s relations with the CCRC and 
specifically the CCRC’s reaction to CLSIP applications. That experience, we 
argue, suggests that the review functions of the CCRC - and by 
implication, those of the Court of Appeal - do not, as officially defined and 
interpreted, enable these institutions properly to address the structural 
vulnerabilities revealed in Part 1.   
Some of the cases that come to the CLSIP are referred by solicitors, 
other agencies or organisations. But many are self-referrals from 
prisoners or their families who often learn of the work of the project 
through word of mouth: in particular, the publicity surrounding the 
exoneration of Dwaine George led to a surge of requests. Responding to 
initial letters from prisoners can be challenging: sometimes they are very 
isolated and struggle to explain their case and its circumstances in 
writing. Furthermore, most cases only reach the project when lawyers 
have closed the file: typically, clients have already used up their appeal 
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options and, in some cases, have already been unsuccessful with their 
first application to the CCRC (which is their only route to a second 
appeal). The first step is always to establish the client’s version of events 
and then examine the available case papers obtained from the client’s 
previous solicitor for any indications of innocence or doubts about the 
validity of the conviction.  To do this, the CLSIP uses volunteer law 
students working under academic and, when available, professional legal 
supervision.  Students work in groups of around six with a more 
experienced student team leader.  Often the CLSIP will seek further 
disclosure from the police or CPS but this is usually refused: the police are 
reluctant to spend time and resources disclosing material in relation to a 
case that they consider to have been resolved.  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court Judgement in R v Nunn (2014)5 has confirmed that the 
public interest in finality of proceedings means that the common-law duty 
of disclosure post-conviction is not as extensive as the statutory regime 
that prevails until trial. Different police forces invoke variously the Data 
Protection Act, the Human Rights Act and (ironically) the Freedom of 
Information Act to deny disclosure after trial. One approach is to treat all 
requests as Freedom of Information requests - whether or not they have 
been made under that framework - so that the exemptions under the Act 
can be cited as justification for refusing disclosure. In the absence 
(usually) of further disclosure, if it is thought appropriate, an attempt will 
be made by the CLSIP to seek out new evidence or construct new 
argument that might form grounds of appeal: usually these grounds will 
be put to the CCRC in an application for referral to the Court of Appeal. If 
no appeal has yet been made, which is the case in about a third of CLSIP 
cases, authority for an appeal out of time will be sought.  In conducting 
any additional examination of the evidence, the CLSIP is reliant on pro 
bono assistance from experts in various fields including policing, 
medicine, computing, forensic science and psychology.  Since its inception 																																								 																					5	R (on the application of Nunn) v Chief Constable of Suffolk Constabulary and another 
[2014] UKSC 37 	
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in 2006, CLSIP has worked to varying degrees on around 30 cases, most 
of which have been murder convictions. The vast majority of current 
requests for help however involve sexual abuse convictions. The project 
has made 15 applications to the CCRC, including two cases where CLSIP 
has made a second application after the rejection of its first.  All but one 
of the 15 applications have led to a full ‘stage two’ review by the CCRC:6 
six cases are still being considered; one was referred by the CCRC to the 
Court of Appeal and the conviction quashed and 7 applications for referral 
have been turned down.  
Part 1: Truth-finding vulnerabilities in the pre-trial process 
Since the creation of the Criminal Procedures Rules in 2005 we have had 
a legislative foundation for the view that one of the key objectives of the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales is accuracy of outcomes.7 
Yet while endorsing a procedural approach derived from the adversarial 
tradition, recent Royal Commissions and other major reviews such as the 
Auld Report have not provided a systematic account of how truth is found 
within the criminal justice system in England and Wales. But piecing 
together fragments from both academic and official accounts,8 such truth-
finding claims seem to rest on one or more of the following propositions. 
First, there is an adversarial view of truth-finding in which the trial is seen 
as a contest between autonomous parties who seek to present and 
challenge competing accounts of what has happened: this enables an 																																								 																					
6 The majority of applications to the CCRC are rejected at an early stage because they 
are ineligible (not having exhausted their appeal options) or because they raise nothing 
new.  A Stage 2 review means that the CCRC agrees that there are matters in the 
application that warrant investigation and therefore a Case Review Manager (CRM) will 
be appointed to undertake the review.   
7 The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, Part 1, Para 1(1) state that the overriding 
objective of the system is to deal with cases ‘justly’ and that this includes ‘acquitting the 
innocent and convicting the guilty.’  
8 On theories of fact-finding and procedural tradition see the following: G Goodpaster 
(1987) 78 “On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial” Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 133, J Jackson (1988) 10 “Theories of Truth-Finding in Criminal 
Procedure: An Evolutionary Approach: Cardozo Law Review 475, C Brants and S Field 
(2016) ‘Truth-finding, procedural traditions and cultural trust in the Netherlands and 
England and Wales: when strengths become weaknesses’ 20 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 266 
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impartial jury to find facts effectively even without having their own 
powers to seek out evidence. This explanation of truth-finding depends on 
the defence being able actively to seek out available exculpatory evidence 
and present it effectively at trial. Indeed, this account seems to depend 
on some rough equality of investigative arms: otherwise the relative 
strength of the competing versions of reality presented at trial will reflect 
that inequality rather than the intrinsic merit of the potential evidence out 
there. Before the arrival of a professional state police in the 1830s, when 
most prosecutions were conducted by victims rather than the state, this 
may have been a plausible assumption. In more recent times, as the 
adversarial search for evidence has become a contest between an 
organised state police and a legally-funded defence firm, a second, rather 
different, account of fact-finding has been given: the police are said to 
conduct an effective truth-finding investigation which identifies the 
relevant evidence both for and against the accused. Thus, the Runciman 
Commission, a Royal Commission set up in response to the release of the 
Birmingham 6, argued that it was the “duty of the police to investigate 
fairly and thoroughly all the relevant evidence, including that which 
exonerates the suspect".9 In contrast to the traditional adversarial 
account, this places trust in the capacity of the state to act as an active 
but impartial truth-finder and thus the prosecution to act in a quasi-
judicial manner. Official accounts do not consider the relationship between 
these two very different accounts of fact-finding and, in particular, their 
implications for the respective roles of defence and police in the pre-trial 
process. However, one might argue that the duty of the police10 to seek 
																																								 																					
9 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, Cm 2263 (Chair: Lord 
Runciman), 9. The Commission also stated that it is the duty of the police "to discover the 
facts relevant to an alleged or reported criminal offence, including those which may tend 
to exonerate the suspect" Ibid, 69. See now Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996, Code of Practice on Disclosure, Para. 3.4: `In conducting an investigation, the 
investigator should pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or 
away from the suspect.’   
10 For discussion as to whether this really constitutes a duty established in law and some 
scepticism about its enforceability in practice, see C Brants and S Field (2016), op cit., at 
273-4  
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out both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence should now be seen in the 
light of the extensive prosecution duties of advance disclosure in relation 
to unused materials. It might be argued that this enables even a legally-
aided defence to put the relevant exculpatory evidence before the jury. 
But in this article, we argue that the experience of the CLSIP is that none 
of these accounts of how truth-finding might operate consistently reflect 
practice even in the serious cases re-examined by the project (where one 
would expect the most scrupulous concern for rigorous fact-finding). Part 
1 is therefore organised as an examination, in the light of the experience 
of the CLSIP, of the following key propositions. First, that the police 
conduct an effective search for the truth exploring exculpatory as well as 
inculpatory evidence. Secondly, that defence lawyers can be relied upon 
actively to seek out any relevant exculpatory materials. Thirdly, that any 
defence difficulties in actively pursuing an independent search for 
exculpatory materials are compensated for by access to the unused 
material generated by the prosecution.  
 
Police investigations as a systematic and effective search for truth  
The CLSIP’s experience of examining in detail materials from major cases 
raises doubts about whether the relevant police investigations can be 
consistently seen as systematic and effective searches for the truth.  In at 
least eight of the 13 cases where CLSIP has made applications to the 
CCRC those have raised serious concerns about the conduct of the 
investigation.  Miscarriages of justice from many jurisdictions reveal the 
effect of a psychological phenomenon, which has also been widely 
documented in experimental research, known as confirmation bias or 
tunnel vision. This suggests that information is filtered through an 
established lens. Where we have a pre-existing view about the facts (for 
example a suspect’s guilt) we do not deal symmetrically with subsequent 
information. We tend to seek to confirm our pre-existing hypothesis and 
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have difficulty in ‘seeing’ – or seeing the significance of – facts pointing to 
alternative explanations.11 The experience of CLSIP is that in several of 
their cases there has been a strong and early police investment in a 
particular theory of the case and a corresponding neglect of alternative 
hypotheses. Once the police decide that they have a primary suspect their 
energy and time is devoted to building the case against the suspect, 
which sometimes involves the construction and pursuit of active 
strategies for generating new evidence against him or her - for example 
by persuading co-defendants or other potential suspects to assist the 
police in generating additional incriminating evidence. In one case (Case 
6) the police took a co-defendant of the CLSIP’s client on a number of 
trips to locate evidence.12 During several of these car journeys, the co-
defendant apparently made statements in which he implicated himself 
while emphasizing his limited involvement (in comparison to the CLSIP 
client who was given very much the primary role in the murder). The 
admissions and allegations were later recorded in formal statements but 
the conversations in the police cars were largely unrecorded apart from a 
few brief notes which were mainly concerned to record the suspect’s 
acceptance of being interviewed without a solicitor present. The police 
then facilitated a meeting between that same co-defendant and a relative 
immediately before the trial in which the former persuaded the latter to 
give evidence which further implicated the CLSIP’s client. In another case 
(Case 2) the initial investigation produced several essentially “neutral” 
witness statements about the character of the accused in a domestic 
murder.  But some time later, when the CLSIP client had become a 
suspect, the police took new statements from the same people which now 
contained allegations that he had been unkind and unreasonable to his 
																																								 																					
11 C Brants (2013) “Tunnel vision, belief perseverance and bias confirmation: only 
human?” in C. Ronald Huff and M Killias (eds), Wrongful Convictions and Miscarriages of 
Justice at 163-6, Brants and Field (2016), op. cit., at 267. For the related concept of 
construction of conviction see M McConville and others, The Case for the Prosecution 
(1991) 
12 References to CLSIP cases are numbered 1-7 in order to anonymize them.  
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wife (the victim).  The trial was ultimately dominated, in the absence of 
more direct evidence of guilt, by these damaging assessments of 
character (which became particularly powerful indirect evidence of motive 
given that the defence chose not to adduce any positive character 
evidence). The point about these examples is that they illustrate the way 
in which police enquiries may involve strategic choices about who is the 
real target of investigation and an active investment in building evidence 
against them. That raises questions about any conception of the police 
role as one involving a continuing commitment over the course of the 
investigation to explore evidence both for and against the suspect with 
equal zeal and energy. 
This is reflected in some of the CLSIP cases in what seems to be a very 
cursory approach by the police to some aspects of the investigation where 
these do not fit the established police theory of the case. For example, in  
Case 6, the police files reveal a decision not to send cigarette ends found 
at a crime scene for DNA examination because they were not of a brand 
used by the primary suspects. In a couple of cases where the offences 
were associated with burglaries, similar offences in the local area with 
similar modes of operation were identified but there is no record of an 
attempt to pursue this. More commonly there are potential alternative 
suspects in these cases who do not appear to have been vigorously 
investigated because the police feel they already have their ‘man’. The 
CLSIP felt that this was the case in ten of the thirteen cases where CCRC 
applications were made.  In Case 1, individuals were named by a member 
of the public as having been in explicit discussion of the murder and 
describing a good place to dump the body. Yet no statement was taken 
for 8 months, by which time the CLSIP suspect had long been charged 
and a simple denial was accepted. In another example from the same 
case, the lines of communication were more indirect: another member of 
the public reported that a woman had said that her ex-boyfriend was 
responsible for the murder. She indicated that he had some diverse and 
specific connections to the offence (relevant job, car matching description 
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and similar pattern of behaviour), yet the files show no evidence of follow 
up. In Case 4, a member of the public named a person who fitted a 
distinctive description of the perpetrator given by a witness. The police 
abandoned the attempt to contact him when he failed several times to 
answer the mobile phone number they had been given.  
It may be that in relation to each of these instances the police had 
good reasons for doubting the reliability of the original information and 
therefore not prioritizing the follow-up. But if there are such reasons 
which go beyond the fact that a different primary suspect had already 
been identified, they are not recorded in the case-papers. Furthermore, it 
seems that the kind of active truth-finding role envisaged by the 
Runciman Commission would require that in a murder case these persons 
should both be traced and implicated or eliminated in a thorough and 
timely fashion. The fact that the information (if true) would disturb rather 
than confirm the established police theory of the case should not make a 
difference under any view of the police as inquisitorial truth-finders. 
The experience of the CLSIP reflects the conclusions drawn from other 
recent research into murder investigations that once there is a ‘prime 
suspect’ he or she becomes the dominant focus and priority for 
investigation.13 Indeed, it has been said that because Senior Investigating 
Officers are under pressure to be aware of costs of investigations, ‘once 
the suspect was identified, there [is] immense pressure to discontinue 
previous lines of enquiry which were now seen as unproductive and 
costly’.14 This suggests the vulnerability of any theory that the police can 
be relied upon, without external prompting, to seek out exculpatory as 
well as inculpatory evidence.  
 
Defence lawyers and the pursuit of exculpatory materials 
																																								 																					
13 M Innes (2003) Investigating Homicide at 256-9,  
F Brookman and M Innes M (2013) “The problem of success: What is a good homicide 
investigation”23 Policing and Society 292 at 297. 
14 Innes, op. cit. at 261-2. 
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A classical adversarial theory of truth-finding assumes independent 
proactive investigation by the defence.15 The CLSIP cases involve some 
impressive examples of very detailed and insightful work by defence 
lawyers: finding and obtaining statements from supportive witnesses, 
seeking out experts and challenging the evidence from many angles. Yet 
the cases also reveal some failures and some very considerable structural 
obstacles to any active defence search for exculpatory evidence. There 
are examples of failures to appreciate the significance of relevant 
information and thus to commission expert reports that might have been 
critical. For example, in Case 1, the prosecution account of events relied 
on CCTV footage of what was allegedly the defendant’s car making the 
trip to dispose of the body in water at a precise location and at a precise 
time.  So the prosecution case depended on the body having been in the 
water long enough to make the alleged time of disposal plausible. Yet 
when the original pathology report did not even consider the issue of how 
long the victim’s body had been in the water the defence neither 
questioned this nor sought to conduct further tests.16  In another case 
(Case 7) the defence failed to obtain psychological reports which would 
have indicated (as they now have) that the defendant’s learning disability 
was such that his understanding and ability to process information and 
explain his actions was extremely limited. This was highly relevant not 
just to his capacity to give reliable answers in police custody or under 
cross-examination but even to understand the trial process. 
More generally and more frequently the cases reveal the limited 
capacity of the defence to overcome any lacuna in the police search for 
exculpatory material. We have pointed above to several cases in which 
investigation into potential alternative suspects was not pursued in a 
																																								 																					
15 Jackson, Goodpaster, op. cit. 
16 For more examples of defence failures to seek out exculpatory evidence see Field and 
Brants. In two recent collections, a range of experienced lawyers and investigative 
journalists have argued that inadequate preparation by first instance defence lawyers is 
a key causal influence in many miscarriages of justice: J Robins (ed.) (2012) Wrongly 
Accused and J Robins (ed.) (2013) No Defence: Lawyers and Miscarriages of Justice. 
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timely and thorough manner. We should spare a thought for the position 
in which those police failures leave the defence solicitor, who may be 
faced with the difficult task of finding and interviewing the relevant 
suspects. They might well refuse to answer (further) questions. If they 
do, it would be very dangerous for the defence barrister to summons 
them as witnesses: who knows what they might say and what impact 
their testimony might have? This illustrates the way in which the defence 
are at a major structural disadvantage in pursuing independently the 
relevant exculpatory evidence, lacking effective powers to arrest, 
interrogate and search, or indeed even to keep under surveillance, those 
unlikely to wish to co-operate with the defence.  Furthermore, all of this 
assumes that the defence can identify and find alternative suspects 
mentioned in unused prosecution materials. But it is by no means certain 
that their significance will be recognised and understood by the defence. 
This brings us to the capacity of the defence to exploit unused material. 
 
Defence difficulties in appreciating the significance of material 
theoretically available to it.  
We have suggested that one possible way of constructing a coherent 
account of truth-finding in England and Wales is to argue that defence 
difficulties in actively pursuing an independent search for exculpatory 
materials may be compensated for by access to the unused material 
generated by the prosecution. The prosecution has an ongoing duty to 
review materials in their possession and normally to disclose anything 
that is capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the 
defence.17 Beyond that, the defence normally have rights of access to 
materials held by the police and listed in the schedule of unused material 																																								 																					
17 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, s 3(1)a. There are continuing doubts 
about the effectiveness of the implementation of disclosure rights: D Ormerod, 
“Editorial: A Further Review of Disclosure”, [2013] Crim LR 97, M Fouzder “Prosecution 
disclosure failures to be probed” Law Society Gazette 6 July 2016, available at 
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/prosecution-disclosure-failures-to-be-
probed/5056412.fullarticle. For a summary of rules on prosecution disclosure generally, 
see A Ashworth and M Redmayne (2010) Criminal Process, pp. 259-262. 
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if they can show them to be relevant to their case. But the significance of 
the listed items will not necessarily be evident from the categories used in 
the schedule. Behind possibly unrevealing labels will be a myriad of 
actions, messages, documents, statements, exhibits and other material 
generated by the original police investigation that will not simply be 
routinely disclosed. To get access to these materials and to construct an 
alternative narrative from them, the defence will need to make sense of 
the police investigation and its selective strategic choices and to begin to 
grasp the complex buried connections between what may appear to be 
very disparate facts. This requires knowledge and experience of how such 
investigations are conducted and documented - in particular of the 
relevant official protocols as to how such investigations should be 
conducted and recorded.18 Only then can the defence appreciate any 
potential ‘gaps’ in the disclosed materials by knowing what should be 
there. CLSIP has needed access to expert pro-bono police advice to 
enable it effectively to interrogate police practice in this way.  
The key to making sense of how an investigation has developed is to 
know how, and in what order, documents have been indexed. This is 
difficult for the defence because some critical documentation, such as the 
central, cross-referenced HOLMES Nominal Index, is not routinely 
disclosed (and certainly not in unedited form).19 Defence solicitors have 
only limited access to HOLMES computer technology and only the more 
specialist firms use any kind of casework software. Furthermore, the 
format in which the schedule of unused materials is presented varies 
considerably and frequently does not contain important information such 
as dates: this makes it very difficult to understand the relationship 
																																								 																					
18 National Centre for Policy Excellence (CENTREX)/Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO), Guidance on Major Incident Room Standardized Administrative Procedures 2005 
(MIRSAP), library.college.police.uk/docs/APPref/MIRSAP.pdf and Murder Investigation 
Manual 2006: library.college.police.uk/docs/APPREF/murder (both last accessed 17th 
October 2016).  19	HOLMES (Home Office Large and Major Enquiry System) is a computer-based 
information management system and the Nominal Index lists the names of those who 
have come into contact with the investigation.  
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between events or facts. What makes things worse is that, in several 
cases, the CLSIP has found significant anomalies in the sequencing and 
organisation of documentation which do not make chronological sense 
and suggest incomplete, tardy and/or inaccurate indexing and perhaps re-
indexing. Sometimes, for example, actions have been recorded as having 
taken place before the message on which the action was apparently based 
had even been received. For example, in one case an investigative Action 
was recorded as allocated at a specific time but the result of that Action 
was logged at an earlier time. In another, there was a record of a Senior 
Investigating Officer being informed of actions, which - according to the 
indexing - had not yet taken place. Of course, each and every one of 
these anomalies may be explained by incompetence, failure to follow 
established protocols, or simple error. But sometimes they raise 
suspicions that documents may have been substituted or removed or re-
ordered. 
The problem is that it is virtually impossible for defence lawyers, even 
if they are able to identify anomalies, to pursue and investigate these 
anomalies and tactically very dangerous to argue that the record has 
been constructed to support the prosecution hypothesis without some 
very precise evidence of who has done what and why.  Without that, it 
will always be very provocative to run a trial defence on the basis of 
police construction of the evidence.  In one case (Case 4) there was an 
absolutely crucial police message which described a suspect wearing a 
very distinctive item in a very particular way. The item concerned was 
found near the crime scene. The timing of this message was critical in 
that it provided apparently independent corroboration for exactly the 
same strange detail in a co-defendant’s statement to police in which he 
incriminated the CLSIP client. But the relevant message was subject to a 
number of recording anomalies: it was not recorded in the Incident Log, it 
was not properly referenced on the schedule of unused material, and was 
not properly referenced or signed off by the Indexer.  Indeed, the 
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reference on the message to its place on the unused schedule was 
incorrect.  The message did not appear on the schedule at all and the 
corresponding number related to an entirely different message.  Of 
course, given the importance of the message to the prosecution case, 
these kinds of anomalies raised questions about the integrity of the 
incriminating message.  Might it have been created at a later stage in 
order to artificially strengthen the evidence? But it is virtually impossible 
for the defence to investigate such suspicions in the pre-trial process and 
it would be very dangerous to suggest police manipulation of evidence at 
trial without having proof.  
The more general difficulty is that the time and expertise required to 
examine and cross reference all this material may prove simply too 
demanding for defence lawyers: the risk of missing an important piece of 
evidence (or the connection between two apparently unrelated facts 
within this mass of material) is considerable. What the CLSIP is able to do 
is to draw on a very considerable amount of time volunteered by students 
(organized into teams led by an experienced student team leader who is 
in turn supervised by the first author). They become used to trawling 
through the police interview transcripts, court documents, witness 
statements, expert reports and the other paperwork, tapes and videos 
that amass in a major investigation and lengthy legal process. In some 
cases, connections between facts have emerged from this detailed 
trawling that had apparently eluded the original defence lawyers.  
Much of this involves developing a detailed understanding of the 
contexts and background to relationships in the case in order to 
understand how the prosecution narrative has been constructed. For 
example, where a suspect or co-defendant becomes a key witness for the 
prosecution, it may be important to develop a picture of the relationship 
between that person and the investigating team. This may suggest the 
testimony for the prosecution was the result of negotiations. In one CLSIP 
case (Case 5), close scrutiny of disclosed officers’ reports on informant 
handling, prison visiting information and custody records revealed a 
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pattern of contact between witnesses, the informant and the police. This 
not only deviated from standard informant procedures but also involved 
certain suspects being dropped from the police investigation as well as 
significant rewards for the informant (time out from prison; moves from 
one prison to another).  With a great deal of investment of time these 
links were traceable through the unused material, yet they had not been 
put before the jury by the defence at first instance. In another example, 
Case 3, a CLSIP client was convicted solely on the basis of telephone 
records linking him to a mobile phone used in the crime.  However, close 
scrutiny by a student researcher of a mass of phone records eventually 
revealed that one of the co- defendants lived in the same cell site area 
and shared many of the contacts stored in the phone with the CLSIP 
client.  In other words, the only incriminating evidence in relation to the 
CLSIP client – which was the presence of his friends and family members 
in the phone’s memory – was also equally applicable to a co-defendant. 
This had not been identified at trial and the co-defendant was acquitted 
on the direction of the Judge on the basis that there was insufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to convict him.  The effect was that the 
CLSIP client had been convicted on evidence that was equally 
incriminating of the acquitted co-defendant.  Moreover, that co-defendant 
had a very serious criminal record (whereas the CLSIP client had none) 
and, unlike the CLSIP client, he had been implicated in the case by certain 
witnesses. But the important point to emphasize is the difficulties that 
exist for defence lawyers in identifying all the relevant factual connections 
latent in the unused materials. The size and complexity of these materials 
is such that it requires the ability to put aside considerable amounts of 
time to know the files with sufficient precision and detail. There are real 
material constraints on the capacity of defence lawyers to do this under 
the increasing economic pressure of legal aid cuts: under the current 
graduated fixed fee system, solicitors get a sum based on the number of 
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pages disclosed, not the time taken to read them.20  So for many 
solicitors struggling to make a profit from their criminal work, it is hard to 
invest lots of time on poring over disclosed documents and schedules of 
potentially disclosable materials. It has to be said that it may not simply 
be a matter of limited time and resources: generalist criminal solicitors 
only deal infrequently with not guilty pleas involving major large-scale 
investigations. In several cases CLSIP clients have felt that the 
inadequacy of their legal advisors’ pre-trial preparation and 
representation at first instance was linked to inexperience in relation to 
major cases and have sought help from more specialist firms after 
conviction. 
We have suggested that the capacity of the system to find facts 
accurately at first instance rests upon the assumptions identified at the 
start of the article. CLSIP experience suggests that in those cases where 
things go wrong it is often because those assumptions are not reflected in 
practice on the ground.  
Part 2: CCRC and the Cardiff Law School Innocence Project 
In Part 2 we argue that the way in which the CCRC has responded to 
CLSIP applications suggests that its statutory review functions do not 
adequately compensate for the structural vulnerabilities in fact-finding 
identified in Part 1. The experience of the CLSIP – admittedly based on 
only a limited number of cases – is that it is only under very particular 
conditions that the CCRC will investigate relevant leads that might (or 
indeed should) have been pursued by the police or the defence. This 
suggests significant doubts as to whether the CCRC can provide an 
effective guarantee of the integrity and coherence of police investigations 
																																								 																					
20 F Garland and J Ewan J (2012) “Embracing the overriding objective: difficulties and 
dilemmas in the new criminal climate” 16 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 233 
at 245, A Nurse (2013) “The client comes first: effective representation and investigation 
to prevent miscarriages of justice” in J Robins J (ed) No Defence: Lawyers and 
Miscarriages of Justice at 77  
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as an inquiry into truth and that all relevant evidence has been put before 
the fact-finder by the defence.  
 
Responding to challenges to the integrity, coherence and 
completeness of police investigations 
The CLSIP experience is that arguing that the police investigation is 
selective in the narratives it has sought to construct will not be enough to 
prompt either referral or re-investigation. For example, where the CLSIP 
has suggested that the police may have been negotiating off the record 
with a co-defendant to secure his co-operation in actively constructing the 
case against its client, the CCRC commented simply that it saw no 
evidence of ‘improper’ pressure or influence (Case 6). The implication is 
that the strategic construction or targeting of investigations is not 
improper. As for suggestions that a police investigation may be 
incomplete because the police have made only cursory attempts to seek 
out witnesses where this might disturb the established police narrative 
(for example to investigate potential alternative suspects), the CCRC 
responded as follows in a Statement of Reasons21 in Case 4: 
“At the beginning of a major investigation the police will identify 
numerous lines of enquiry.  As the investigation continues some 
lines of enquiry fall away before they are completed because the 
focus of the investigation can be narrowed in response to emerging 
evidence.  Provided this process does not result in a valid line of 
investigation being lost, and all relevant information is disclosed to 
the defence during the trial process, there can be no criticism of the 
police handling of the case.” 
 
The problem is that without investigation of such alternative suspects it is 
not easy to know whether a valid line of investigation has been lost.  
In applications, the CLSIP will often point to anomalies, undiscovered or 
unpursued by the police or defence, which seem to cast doubt on the 
prosecution theory of the case and therefore (in the CLSIP view) warrant 																																								 																					21	This refers to a document which sets out the CCRC reasons for not referring a case to 
the Court of Appeal	
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further investigation. Generally, the CLSIP has struggled to persuade the 
CCRC on this basis that further scientific investigations should be 
conducted, that witnesses should be (re)interviewed or reviews 
undertaken into aspects of the police investigation. The suggestion that 
the original investigation or presentation of evidence looks incomplete or 
superficial in certain specified regards, without a specific investigative act 
being competently conducted, is not of itself regarded as a sufficient 
reason for the CCRC to carry it out now. It might be different if the CLSIP 
could show that carrying out the requested investigative act was likely to 
provide positive concrete evidence that would undermine a significant 
element of the prosecution case and thus cast doubt on the safety of the 
conviction. But the difficulty for the CLSIP is that it does not have the 
powers, financial resources or access to the breadth of expertise 
necessary to conduct the investigations that it thinks the police or defence 
should have conducted: had it such resources it would have done so prior 
to the application to the CCRC. Therefore, it cannot say what the outcome 
of doing that further investigation would be likely to be. For example, in 
one case (Case 6) the CLSIP raised concerns about a person with 
connections to the case who had been implicated by certain witnesses but 
never apparently treated as a suspect. But when the CLSIP requested that 
he be investigated, the CCRC reaction was that there was no evidence to 
suggest that he was involved in the murder. The CLSIP reaction in turn 
was that investigation was needed exactly to find out whether there was 
further evidence against him.  
In effect, the CLSIP feels that these leads should be pursued 
because, where there are doubts about the integrity of the investigation 
of a serious case, a full investigation into the truth should be conducted 
by the state. That of course reflects assumptions more associated with 
the inquisitorial tradition in criminal procedure. The CCRC does not see its 
role as extending to ensuring the adequacy of the investigation as a 
search for truth. That may be an understandable response to budgetary 
constraints and a limited statutory remit. But it means that we have no 
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external institution ensuring that we make good on the Runciman 
Commission’s vision of the truth-finding police investigation.  
 
Responding to failures of active defence investigation  
We have pointed out that one of the assumptions underpinning an 
adversarial theory of truth-finding is that it is for the defence 
independently to seek out and present the available exculpatory evidence. 
We have suggested that in the cases examined by CLSIP, this by no 
means always happens before the trial at first-instance. But where the 
CLSIP points to potential exculpatory evidence that has been left 
unexplored by the defence, it certainly does not follow that the CCRC will 
see it as its role to pursue the issues. Where an explanation is given for 
such refusal in its Statement of Reasons, there are two common elements 
to the response. First, that the evidence was available at the time of trial, 
therefore the issues raised are not new and could not therefore be the 
basis for a referral to the Court of Appeal. It is not therefore the CCRC’s 
role to investigate them. Secondly, that the unexplored anomalies have 
not been shown to be likely to affect the safety of the conviction and 
therefore do not warrant further investigation. The effect of the first 
difficulty is that the truth-finding capacity of the system is to a very 
significant extent dependent on thorough and active defence investigation 
of potential exculpatory evidence before the first trial. Where that does 
not happen the defendant’s legitimate interests and the truth-finding 
capacity of the system will be significantly and irrevocably prejudiced. The 
CLSIP will sometimes argue that an examination of the case papers by an 
expert working pro-bono suggests that specific investigative acts – such 
as the analysis of phone records (Case 6) - should have been conducted 
and therefore should be conducted by the CCRC. Often the CCRC will 
respond that it was open to both sides to have done whatever further 
analysis they chose before trial. The fact that they did not do so means 
this cannot form the basis of a referral now (because it is not new). If the 
CLSIP expresses concern about unrecorded meetings between the police 
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and original suspects (perhaps because followed by their immediate 
release and the arrest of those they incriminate), the CCRC response is 
likely to be that a challenge could have been made at trial to the 
admissibility of the statements, thus this is not a new argument and 
therefore cannot provide grounds for referral. 
In effect, the adversarial preference for a one-shot trial leaves us 
with fact-finding that is based on a one-shot investigation: if there is 
anything to the points we have made in Part 1 about the structural limits 
to both police and defence preparedness and capacity to fully investigate 
exculpatory evidence then the CCRC does not see itself as being in a 
position to make up for such weaknesses. 
The second common CCRC response to anomalies in the 
investigation - that they have not been shown to be likely to affect the 
safety of the conviction and therefore do not warrant further investigation 
– also suggests the limits to the capacity of the CCRC to respond to 
failures in pre-trial investigation. The CLSIP often feels that it has pointed 
to several significant weaknesses in the way the police investigation was 
conducted in cases where the evidence against the accused is a long way 
from overwhelming and potential relevant exculpatory evidence has not 
been pursued. The unease of the CLSIP about the conviction is often 
cumulative: it is not that this or that failing on its own calls the integrity 
and coherence of the whole investigation into doubt. Rather it is the 
combination of failings that creates that doubt. But this kind of 
generalised critique of the investigation is not what the CCRC wants to 
hear: it wants the CLSIP to identify a particular piece of evidence that was 
not available at trial that substantially undermines a significant element of 
the prosecution case.22 Often it will respond in relation to each of a 
number of identified anomalies that they do not have any obvious 
implication for the safety of the conviction.  
 																																								 																					
22 This is what Laurie Elks has described as the ‘atomistic’ approach:(L Elks (2010) “The 
Criminal Cases Review Commission: Time for a Review” 7 Justice Journal 6.  
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Responding to failures in procedures relating to disclosure 
Given the above, it is perhaps predictable that the CCRC should be very 
reluctant to take up arguments simply based on the lack of coherence of 
the police investigation as evidenced by the documentation available to 
CLSIP. The kind of thing that CLSIP has identified in various cases are 
discrepancies involving a Crime Scene Log which suggested that people 
had found items at times they were not present, police Actions apparently 
completed before they were issued, unsigned alterations to the exhibit list 
or the absence of an audit trail of movement of key exhibits. Again, often 
the CCRC response is to treat these as errors with no demonstrated 
implications for the safety of the conviction. This extends even to 
situations when CLSIP has identified what appear to be systematic failures 
to apply established MIRSAP protocols in relation to recording practices in 
operating the HOLMES computer system. The CCRC response has been 
that failure to comply with such protocols is not of itself malpractice and 
that, short of demonstrated wrong-doing, it is for the police to decide 
what recording practices best enable them to investigate the crime in 
question. For the CLSIP, the established police protocols exist to ensure 
and demonstrate the integrity of the investigation. Yet they do not seem 
to constitute enforceable expectations. This has implications for any 
suggestion that extensive rights to advance disclosure can put defence 
lawyers in a position to use prosecution materials to develop defence 
arguments. In order proactively to develop their lines of investigation and 
even to challenge the police investigation, defence lawyers need to be 
able to follow the detailed relationships between disparate facts, including 
those relating to the conduct of the investigation. Yet they may be 
presented with a mass of disclosed documentation that is incoherent, 
incomplete or contradictory. But arguments that MIRSAP protocols on 
recording major investigations have not been followed is unlikely to 
prompt re-investigation or referral by the CCRC. Thus, if (for example) 
the CLSIP points out that police records indicate that an Action has taken 
place before it has been allocated, the CCRC response is that that action 
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will not have been before the jury and thus cannot have influenced the 
verdict. More generally, incoherence or contradiction in the 
documentation of the investigation is a long way away from the kind of 
close connection that the CCRC wants between identification of specific 
new evidence and the undermining of a significant element of the 
prosecution narrative at trial.  
 
Conclusions 
What our statutory provisions for appeal do not seem to do - even with 
the addition of the CCRC - is to offer general guarantees of the truth-
finding integrity and reliability of the state investigation into the facts. The 
cases referred by the CLSIP project to the CCRC are based on 
investigations where close analysis of the documentation suggests 
significant doubts, uncertainties and contradictions. But the CCRC does 
not see its role as to systematically confront or resolve them after the 
normal appeal process has been exhausted. Instead a system still rooted 
in the assumptions of the adversarial tradition offers the defence an 
opportunity to present evidence orally before the jury at trial and to 
criticise the detail of the prosecution evidence. If at trial the defence fails 
to use the resources theoretically available to it in this regard, this can 
cause irreparable prejudice both to defence interests and the truth-finding 
capacity of the criminal justice system. Unless there is new evidence that 
was simply not available before trial, the system assumes that one first-
instance defence opportunity to put forward an effective critique of the 
police investigation and to identify and present exculpatory evidence is 
enough. In their evidence before the Justice Select Committee, several 
representatives of innocence projects (and others engaged in 
investigating miscarriages of justice) expressed doubts about the capacity 
of the established criminal justice institutions to correct first-instance 
errors. CLSIP experience is based on a small number of serious cases 
where suspects continue to protest their innocence long after conviction. 
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These are unlikely to be a representative sample even of serious cases. 
Yet the failings in these cases relate to some critical assumptions about 
truth-finding: that the police will search for exculpatory evidence with the 
same zeal as they do inculpatory evidence, that defence lawyers will find 
relevant helpful evidence through active autonomous investigations or be 
able effectively to challenge the prosecution theory of the case with 
disclosed materials.  In those cases where this does not happen at first 
instance, the experience of the Cardiff Law School Innocence Project 
suggests doubts as to about how well equipped our criminal justice 
system is to correct such flaws after conviction. These questions are likely 
to become even more pressing with growing financial pressures on both 
police resources and those of the legally-aided defence.  
 
 
 
